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Abstract This paper argues for a return to the social thought of the often ignored early 
20th Century English thinker G.D.H. Cole. Cole combined a sociological critique of 
capitalism and liberal democracy with a well developed alternative in his work on 
Guild Socialism bearing particular relevance to advanced capitalist societies. Both of 
these, with their focus on the limitations on ‘free and unfettered service’ in 
associations and the inability of capitalism to yield emancipation in either production 
or consumption, are relevant to social theorists looking to understand, critique and 
contribute to the subversion of neoliberalism.  Therefore, we suggest that Cole’s 
associational sociology, and the invitation it provides to think of formations beyond 
capitalism and liberal democracy, is a timely and valuable resource which should be 
returned to. 
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In 2010, Routledge published new editions of some of G.D.H. Cole’s works. While a highly 
welcomed decision, little room was made for the distinctively sociological works of Cole, 
such as Social Theory (1920) and Essays in Social Theory (1950). This did not come as a 
surprise, for Cole was, and continues to be known, for his political ideas and activism. A 
close inspection of his works, including the most ostensibly political ones such as Guild 
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Socialism Restated (1980), nevertheless reveals an acute interest in sociological theorising. 
His rejection of what he viewed as an ‘isolation of specialized studies from the general study 
of Society as a whole’ (Cole, 1950: 29) in early 20th century British sociology1 meant that he 
consistently sought to articulate sociological concerns with those of a political nature. Thus, 
although a sociological perspective is clearly discernible in his work, it assumes a distinctive 
form, combining both a critical and normative outlook. 
 
Imbued with the task of stimulating large-scale social change and shaping its direction, 
Cole’s works were underpinned by the typically modernist concern for the development of 
emancipatory practices, particularly discernible during his Guild Socialist phase.2 In this 
article we demonstrate what this has to offer social theory today by exposing both the 
distinctiveness of his perspective and its relevance to contemporary conditions.  There have 
been attempts to revive Cole for contemporary discussion, most prominently in the work of 
Hirst on associative democracy (Hirst 1994).  Hirst returned to Cole’s ideas – which we will 
discuss below – of free association and functional representation (despite the criticisms he 
offers of Cole’s conception of this, Hirst 1994:45) as central to a new social and political 
                                                          
1 See Dawson and Masquelier (2015) for more detail on Cole’s relation to sociology in Britain 
2 Such a phase, characterised by a ‘politics of democratic persuasion and individual freedom’ (Stears, 2006: 
274) is often distinguished from later concerns regarding socialist strategy and tactics and the acceptance of a 
positive role for the state and planning in international affairs, in response to the political and economic crises of 
the 1920s and 1930s (Holthaus, 2014), for Wright (1979) Cole moves from guild socialism to ‘liberal socialism’ 
in an attempt to defend the British order against fascism.  Although he is said to have eventually returned to his 
initial libertarian concerns (Stears, 2006), Cole never really abandoned the view that ‘Socialists [...] do not 
regard the increase in State control over economic affairs [...] as marking any advance towards a Socialist 
system’ (Cole, 1938: 204) and in his final book argued ‘I feel sure that a Socialist society…must rest on the 
widest possible diffusion of power and responsibility, so as to enlist the active participation for as many as 
possible of its citizens in the tasks of democratic self-government’ (Cole 1960: 337).  Therefore, while 
throughout the rest of the article we will refer to Cole’s guild socialist ‘phase’, by this we mean the period 
(mainly from 1917-1925) in which Cole was an active member of the guild socialist movement and used its 
terms, without also saying that this was a normatively distinct phase of Cole’s oeuvre.  
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order.  While Hirst’s work, along with that of other writers we will discuss below, has been 
admirable in its attempt to demonstrate Cole’s relevance to the current day, these share two 
factors which we aim to move away from in this article.  Firstly, in such arguments, Cole is 
presented primarily as a political theorist, with his associational view seen as political 
‘pluralism’.  Secondly, in doing so, some commentators such as Stears (2006) have seen 
Cole’s pluralism as innately socialist, while others have downplayed the connection of Cole’s 
normative pluralism to his critique of capitalism (See for example Hirst 1994:19).  Contrary 
to such accounts, we shall present Cole as a sociologist who spoke about the value of a 
normatively-driven sociological approach and decried those who had adopted a Weberian 
value-free perspective (Cole 1957c).  
 
We shall begin by drawing the broad contours of what we term his ‘associational sociology’.  
This will include highlighting the importance of a sociological reading of Rousseau on Cole’s 
thought and how he distances himself from Durkheim.  It will then be shown how his 
sociological stance informed his own critique of capitalism and liberal democracy.  Here we 
note similarities and differences between Cole’s critique and that of Marxism, as well as his 
value as potential critic of neoliberalism. This will be followed by a discussion of his 
sociological alternative, marked by a focus on the potential for associative action and its 
political representation.  We will also discuss some of the key tendencies towards social 
change Cole identified, and their relevance to present-day conditions. 
 
Drawing the Contours of Cole’s Associational Sociology 
Cole was a prominent figure in the short-lived Guild Socialist movement of the early 
twentieth century. The movement located associative life at the centre of its socialist vision, 
treating it as the principal precondition for emancipatory practices. For Cole, associative 
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action is not so much a utopian vision to force onto social life as an essential component of 
any pre-existing social organisation. This is explained by the fact that ‘almost every 
individual in [society] has [...] close contacts with many diverse forms of social institution 
and association’ (Cole, 1920: 4). As trade unionists, members of a sports team or political 
party, at the workplace or in their leisure time, individuals often share a ‘common purpose or 
purposes’ and ‘rules of common action’ which are essential components of associative action 
(Cole, 1920: 37). This led Cole to treat the ‘action of men in association’ as ‘the subject 
matter of social theory’ (Cole, 1920: 17). Associative action itself, then, presupposes all 
forms of social organisation and, correspondingly, acts as an essential medium for the 
development of societal norms and value structures.  
 
For Cole, then, associative action is a social fact and sociology’s most fundamental unit of 
analysis. But how does he explain individuals’ willingness to enter into association with 
others and adopt cooperative forms of action? Two dimensions can be found in Cole’s 
explanation. The first one focuses on the rational component of associative action, where 
‘[t]he consciousness of a want requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction is the basis of 
association’ (Cole, 1920: 34). The ‘want’ in question can assume a multitude of forms, 
ranging from the production of a material requirement, fulfilling our consumer needs, or the 
pursuit of non-economic interests. These are satisfied through the spheres of production, 
consumption and civic activity (Cole 1920) respectively. The second element is a deeper, 
affective, dimension where individuals engaging in cooperative action are ‘led to do so by a 
strong impulsion of the sentiment of social solidarity’ (Cole, 1950: 128). The existence of a 
multitude of social organisations and the possibility for social order are therefore explained 
by the fact that individuals are cooperative beings by nature. 
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Despite such a prominent emphasis on associative/cooperative action, his sociological 
perspective is first and foremost one concerned with the problem of human emancipation. 
Along with Laski and Tawney, Cole developed a ‘new brand of individualism’ (Stears, 2006: 
102), that sought to remedy the apparent problems associated with the overly communal 
nature of freedom found in Figgisian pluralist thought (Stears, 2006). His works emphasised 
individuals’ continuous desire to maximise their ‘personal liberty’ (Cole, 1920: 184). 
Understood as a form of pleasurable self-expression achieved by the release of the ‘creative, 
scientific and artistic impulses’ (Cole 1980, 115-6), his approach to emancipation echoes 
Marx’s call for the ‘open revelation of human faculties’ in his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (2000: 102).3 It also exhibits features of the reconciliation of sensuous and 
rational faculties advocated by first generation Frankfurt School theorists (Masquelier, 2014).  
 
He was nevertheless critical of the scientific component of the ‘Marxian method’ (Cole, 
1948: 14) for its tendency to dissolve the ‘constructive influence of the minds of men’ (Cole, 
1948: 34) as well as for the corresponding ‘error to attribute to “classes” [...] any reality 
distinct from that of the individuals which compose them’ (Cole, 1948: 11). Insisting that 
‘men make their history,’ he hoped to formulate a sociological perspective in which 
individuals’ own capacity to both control and alter their conditions of existence is fully 
recognised. To do so, he thought, one had to re-assess the respective place held by the general 
(class structures/consciousness) and the particular (individual agents’) conceptions of the 
good life. The reality of the former had to be re-aligned with that of the latter.  
 
                                                          
3 Cole’s work, however, shows no evidence that he had read this particular text, which may have been translated 
in English too late for Cole to get a chance to engage with it. 
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In order to better grasp how Cole attempted to solve the riddle of this relationship, 
exemplified by the antagonism between liberals and communitarians (Eisenberg, 1995),4 one 
has to turn to the inspiration he drew from Rousseau, particularly his concept of general will.  
In doing so, we can see that Cole turned to Rousseau for sociological inspiration rather than 
treating him as a strictly political figure. Indeed, while he admired Rousseau for treating the 
will to cooperate as derivative of an innate impulse towards sociality, Cole also praised his 
views on the effects of associative action on the relationship between individual and 
collective conceptions of the good life. He interpreted such a relationship as follows: 
whenever [individuals] form or connect themselves with any form of association for any 
active purpose, [they] develop in relation to the association an attitude which looks to the 
general benefit of the association rather than their own individual benefit. This is not to say 
that they cease to think of their own individual advantage – only that there is, in their 
associative actions, an element, which may be stronger or weaker, of seeking the advantage of 
the whole association, or of all its members, as distinct from the element which seeks only 
personal advantage. (Cole, 1950: 114) 
Here associative action resurfaces not merely as the product of a will but also as the source of 
social organisation whose object ‘is not merely material efficiency, but also essentially the 
fullest self-expression of all the members’ (Cole, 1920: 208). The purpose of the association 
itself is therefore construed by Rousseau (and Cole) as an extension of individuals’ own 
interests/will. Consequently, the ‘personal freedom’ (Cole, 1917: 5) associations succeed in 
facilitating becomes both constitutive of and constituted by the common good embodied in 
the general will of each association. The freedom arrived at here, therefore, does not consist 
of an unlimited, unhindered or absolute right to act as one pleases, such as Rousseau’s 
‘natural freedom’ (Simpson, 2006). Instead, it takes the shape of a form of moral autonomy 
                                                          
4 Communitarianism should here be understood as a political-philosophical stance giving a central place to the 
values of a group, often at the expense of individual conceptions of the good life. 
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entailing 'obedience to the law which we prescribe to ourselves’ (Rousseau, 1993: 196). Cole 
nevertheless insists that despite its ‘rational precepts,’ this moral freedom ‘finds an echo in 
the heart of the ‘natural man,”’ with ‘”human feeling” as its motivating force’ (Cole, 1993: 
liii-liv).  Therefore, moral freedom and its realisation in the associative will is a building 
block of sociality. 
 
Alongside such a concern for the maximisation of personal freedom in associations, one finds 
what Stears characterised as Cole’s ‘obsession with complex and competing social 
allegiances’ (2006: 99). Their very existence, he thought, meant that in order to remain truly 
free, individuals could not owe allegiance to a single authority, but would instead develop 
different categories of ‘loyalties’ and ‘obligations’ (Cole 1926).  These are determined by the 
type of association – producer, consumer or civic – to which individuals belong. Since they 
develop through associative action, however, these loyalties and obligations are not obstacles 
to autonomy. Instead, they are both a desirable and necessary component of associative life 
giving ‘men [sic and throughout this article] the fullest possible scope for creative activity’ 
(Cole, 1950: 97). It is their capacity to accommodate the principle of ‘self-government’ 
(Cole, 1917) and, as Warren recently put it, yield a ‘power to make collective decisions’ 
through ‘equal participation in collective judgment’ (2001: 60) that associations can, in 
principle, be expected to pave for the way for agency (see Lamb, 2005).  It is through our 
associational activity that, both historically and in day-to-day actions, agency is achieved, 
alongside the personal/creative development of the individual.5 
                                                          
5 Although Eisenberg highlighted Cole’s incapacity to achieve such a goal by failing to ‘understand the need for 
diversity’ and personal development (1995: 74), it seems that Cole was more conscious of such issues than she 
allows him to be. For example, in Essays in Social Theory, Cole emphasises the need to recognise the 
‘continuous adaptation to changing needs and growing knowledge’ (Cole, 1950: 74). Such an oversight could be 
explained by the fact that Eisenberg drew her claims from only one of Cole’s work, namely Social Theory 
(1920)   
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Cole identified one last essential feature of the form of associative life organised around the 
principle of ‘self-government.’ Having observed the development of a ‘spirit of free 
communal service’ (Cole, 1980: 44) in the medieval guilds, Cole envisaged a similar 
development in associations. To be able to yield such a ‘spirit,’ he argued, the individual 
‘must feel that he is enjoying real self-government and freedom at his work; or he will not 
work well and under the impulse of the communal spirit’ (Cole, 1980: 49). This can be 
achieved where associations substitute the ‘motives of greed and fear’ (Cole 1980: 45) with 
the ‘motive of free service’ and ‘breed men capable of being good citizens both in industry 
and in every aspect of social life’ (Cole, 1980: 61). Consequently, associations must free 
themselves from any distortion capable of undermining the fine balance between individual 
conceptions of the good life and the common good.6 
 
To summarise, associative action is central to Cole’s sociology, as it constitutes an innate 
impulse towards sociality, it is thought to be beneficial, if not essential, for human 
emancipation and the development of a solidaristic outlook.  In doing so, Cole shares 
similarities with Durkheim not only in associative action’s role in the development of 
solidarism, but also in the means (guilds/corporations) to achieve this.  Indeed, Cole spoke 
positively of Durkheim’s work as an indication of the kind of social science combining 
analysis of the political and economic, which he favoured (Cole 1934: 3).  A full exposition 
of these links is beyond this paper (see Dawson 2013: 62-83). However, there are some 
                                                          
6 Like Habermas, Cole sought to protect interpersonal relations against the distorting effects of money and 
power. However, Rousseau’s influence on Cole’s wish to turn ‘sentiment’ into ‘a force in the shaping of human 
affairs’ (Cole 1950, 128), led him propose a different relationship between ‘reason ordering and will acting’ 
from the one found in Habermas’s work (Habermas 1989, 82). Indeed, while the latter effectively dissolved 
‘will acting’ in ‘reason ordering’ within his theory of communicative action (See Masquelier 2014), Cole 
attributed a central role to actions driven by the ‘will’ of individuals. 
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differences.  Most notably, Cole emphasised what he saw as the ‘conservative’ nature of 
Durkheim’s theory and its lack of materialism. For Cole, it was capitalism which gave society 
its value structures and Durkheim marginalises this in seeing religion as the base of society 
(Cole 1952:127).  This is why Cole formulated his associational sociology alongside a 
stringent critique of the capitalist economic and socio-political institutions based on the very 
sociological premises detailed above. It is to this critique and a demonstration of its relevance 
to contemporary conditions that we shall now turn.  
 
From Associational Sociology to a Critique of Capitalism and Liberal Democracy 
Cole’s associational sociology informed the core postulates of his critique of capitalism and 
liberal democracy. As an economic system favouring profit over need; competition over 
cooperation; efficiency and productivity over ‘pleasure in work well done’ (Cole, 1980: 61); 
and ‘greed [...] and fear’ over ‘free and communal service’ (Cole, 1980: 44-5), it failed to 
give scope to ‘man’s natural qualities’ (Cole, 1917: 256). Consequently, 
[t]he crowning indictment of capitalism is that it destroys freedom and individuality in the 
worker, that it reduces man to a machine, and that it treats human beings as means to 
production instead of subordinating production to the well-being of the producer. (Cole, 1917: 
24) 
Not only was ‘the primitive social impulse [...] overlaid by bad institutions’ (Cole, 1950: 
129), the latter also destroyed personal freedom while causing the ‘failure of the association 
so affected to fulfil its proper function in Society’ (Cole, 1950: 145). Despite not having lived 
long enough to be able to witness capitalism’s latest evolutions, a close reading of his work 
reveals a contemporary relevance to societies under the rule of neoliberal economic and 
political forces, some of which will be discussed in this section. 
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A first key dimension of his critique relates to the sphere of production. Drawing his 
inspiration from William Morris, Cole wrote extensively on the problems emanating from an 
‘impulse towards self-expression thwarted by commercialism’ (Cole, 1980: 119). Like 
Morris, and unlike Durkheim, Cole was a fervent critic of the division of labour, with a 
particular concern for its tendency to ‘divorce the executant from the designer or planner’ and 
the resulting loss of the ‘dignity of common labour’ (Cole, 1957a: 9). Like the early Marx, he 
treated production as a central outlet for self-expression and cooperative action.7 
Correspondingly, he equated the increased specialisation of tasks engendered by the 
subordination of workers to a productivist regime of capital accumulation with a loss of 
control fatal to production’s essential role in the release of ‘creative, scientific and artistic 
impulses.’ Cole, here, would have also been at home with critics of Fordist scientific 
management on production, such as Braverman (1974).  
 
Since the 1970s, however, innovative methods of production have emerged that are often said 
to have marked the emergence of a ‘post-Fordist’ regime of accumulation aimed at 
overcoming the rigidities of its predecessor (Harvey, 1989; Kumar, 1995). Despite post-
Fordism’s relative success in  achieving a degree of ‘elimination of job demarcation’ 
(Harvey, 1989: 177), managerial horizontalism (Kasmir, 1996) and a generally ‘enhanced 
work satisfaction for the bulk of workers’ (Kumar, 1995: 47), contemporary commentators 
have highlighted its limited capacity to yield authentic and lasting self-expression. This state 
of affairs, it is argued, derives from production processes subjected to highly flexible, 
globalised and competitive labour markets and privatised resources geared towards the 
‘accommodation of ceaseless change’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 17). Often, then, the central 
                                                          
7 As Stears (2006) and Holthaus (2014) noted, Cole did nevertheless express doubts regarding the treatment of 
production as a potential sphere of pleasurable self-expression following the demise of the Guild Socialist  
movement and the economic crisis.  
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resultant of the rule of these neoliberal economic forces is described as an intolerable 
economic insecurity causing the erosion of loyalties and obligations; or, as Sennett (1998) put 
it, ‘the corrosion of character’. 
 
The objective character of such insecurity has been disputed by Doogan whose empirical 
analysis revealed that ‘job stability has not declined and that long-term employment has 
increased in many sectors of the advanced economies’ (Doogan, 2009: 4). It follows that in 
order to find an explanation for the sense of insecurity dominating neoliberal societies, one 
has to move away from the widespread view that the material impact of neoliberalism 
encourages insecurity, towards a diagnosis more inclined to accept the notion of distortion of 
the associative will proposed by Cole. Doogan offers a convincing Bourdieusian 
reconceptualisation of insecurity by treating it as an ideological tool employed for ‘both 
political ends and political advantage’ (Doogan, 2009: 10). But, Cole’s work makes its own 
contribution to the diagnosis by concentrating on the effects of ‘bad institutions’ – most 
notably capitalist markets and corporations – on individuals and, more specifically, their 
capacity to achieve associative self-expression. For, with Cole’s critique of capitalist 
institutions, the neoliberal ‘rhetoric’ of self-reliance and self-responsibility deconstructed 
(and condemned) by Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001: 4), comes to be treated as a barrier to 
both the rational and sentimental motive of associative action. Under its spell, individuals 
cope with the sense of insecurity through an intensified competitive pursuit of self-interest or 
‘rugged individualism’ preventing any inclination towards the communal spirit experienced 
as a desirable or natural end. The resulting disconnection between individual interests and the 
common good means any form of freedom granted by neoliberal market forces becomes 
meaningless. This is explained by the fact that it divorces the longing for secure self-
expression or control, from the form of associative action that could give them the 
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‘confidence without which freedom can hardly be exercised’ (Bauman, 2005, 36). Therefore, 
adapting elements of Cole’s critique of capitalism to a critique of marketization processes 
unfolding under the rule of neoliberalism, makes it possible to gain a fresh insight into the 
‘normative fragmentation of [neoliberal] societies’ (Crouch, 2011: 180). 
 
Moreover, Cole’s critique did not, as did most Marxian critiques of his time, limit itself to 
problems associated with production. Conscious of the fact that the individual worker did 
‘not find his job interesting or pleasurable and seeks his pleasure outside it, in his hours of 
leisure’ (Cole, 1957b: 16), he expressed an early interest in exploring matters regarding 
consumption. Cole quickly came to realise that consumption was subjected to very similar 
repressive forces to those found in production. Like producers, he argued, consumers lacked 
the capacity to exert sufficient control over the decisions taken within their own sphere of 
activity. By ‘dictat[ing] the consumer what he shall consume’ and ‘exploit[ing] the 
community as the individual profiteer exploits it to-day’ (Cole, 1917: 108), commercial 
agencies deny individuals the ‘freedom for the creative impulse’ as well as for ‘the impulse 
of free and unfettered service’ (Cole, 1917: 302). While neoliberal regimes have made 
markets more responsive to consumer demands, thereby recognising that ‘wants are of the 
most diverse character’ (Cole, 1920: 33), this development has also been accompanied by a 
further atomisation of society. Any potential for collective ‘control of consumption’ (Cole 
1917: 281) is lessened under such a regime. Once again, then, Cole’s own condemnation of 
the distortion of a potential sphere of self-expression and associative action by divisive 
economic forces appears to bear striking relevance to present conditions. In fact, like 
Bauman, Cole viewed the solitary search for pleasure in consumption as an insufficient 
condition for an effective and sustained gratification – or what Bauman (2000) would call ‘de 
facto individualisation’ – dependent on forms of collective control heavily distorted by 
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untrammelled market forces.8 Therefore, while Cole shared the emphasis on consumption as 
a realm of identity found in contemporary sociology, he combined this with a materialist 
critique of its atomised form. 
 
Cole also took the care of explaining what he thought were the causal origins of such 
distortive tendencies:  
In our own Society at least, and in the larger industrialised communities generally, economic 
divisions are at the present time the principal obstacles to the fulfilment of social functions. 
(Cole, 1920:  151) 
Therefore, in common with Marxian ideas of the conflict between labour and capital, Cole 
wished to emphasise the highly distorting effects of such a conflict on the experience of 
associative action. Under a clearly identifiable relationship between ownership and control, 
such as the one found under the early capitalist stage, the conflict of interest between the 
capitalist owner and wage labourer visibly lies at the root of the some of the major obstacles 
to cooperation and self-expression. Once wage labourers come to include ‘technical 
specialists, managers, financial experts, buyers and agents whose status and remuneration 
were a long way above those of the manual workers and of workshop foremen and 
supervisors’ (Cole, 1938: 102), one witnesses a ‘blurring of class-divisions’ (Cole, 1938: 
128) posing new challenges for collective action. While, as Cole observed, such a state of 
affairs, partly driven by the spread of ‘financial capitalism’ (Cole, 1938), did not prevent the 
‘growing concentration of control of capital’ (Cole, 1938: 126) it did divide the working-class 
movement (Cole, 1948: 155). The historical significance of a new and ‘greatly differentiated’ 
proletariat comprising many ‘grades of labour and levels of incomes and education’ (Cole, 
                                                          
8 For a more detailed discussion of the affinity between Cole and Bauman, see Dawson (2013). 
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1948: 171), such as the one found in the neoliberal age, was therefore anticipated by Cole in 
the immediate post-war era. 
 
Thus far we have highlighted the following critiques from Cole: the lack of self-expression in 
work; the distorting of ‘free and unfettered service’ in associations; lack of control in 
consumption, the origins of economic distortion and the fragmented nature of class 
inequality.  However, additional effects of these inequalities can also be identified beyond the 
economic sphere, making Cole’s critique also one of the political. Cole viewed the modern 
state as ‘an organ of class domination’ both ‘perverted by the power of the capitalists’ and 
‘based on coercion’ (Cole, 1980: 122). Here he argued that the liberal democratic conception 
of the state as a ‘self-subsistent and individual realit[y] similar to, or greater than, the persons 
who are members of [it]’ (1920: 22), not only acts as a barrier to the political representation 
of the plurality of interests making up social life, but also embodies a ‘conception of human 
society in terms of Force and Law’ (Cole, 1920: 6). Consequently, liberal democracy is said 
to rely on a conception of the common good which it has to manufacture in the face of 
‘contending sections’ (Cole, 1920: 150) found in a highly hostile capitalist economy. As the 
effective product of competing interests, then, the capitalist state ultimately fails to recognise 
‘the motives which hold men together in association’ (Cole, 1920: 6); it fails to recognise the 
associative wills.  
 
Cole was therefore conscious of, and indeed highly concerned by, the tendency of socio-
economic inequalities to undermine the democratic character of political decision-making. 
His critique of liberal democratic institutions is therefore first and foremost a critique of 
capitalism. The ‘predominance of economic factors’ (Cole, 1980: 180) found in societies 
whose (economic and political) institutions are oriented towards capital accumulation, 
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effectively distorts decision-making processes.   The result of this is the reproduction, at the 
political level, of the conflictual relations found in the economy, coming to undermine the 
forms of collective control necessary for truly democratic action. Cole, then, ‘treated the 
influence of economic factors upon non-economic forms of association as a form of 
perversion’ (Cole, 1920: 145). However, since Cole wrote most of his works during the 
liberal stage of capitalist development comprising a state seeking to minimise its role in 
economic affairs, he did not live long enough to witness the emergence of the neoliberal 
state. This ‘distinctive form of [the neoliberal] state’ (Jessop, 2002: 95) is, contrary to its 
liberal counterpart, clearly ‘proactive in promoting the competitiveness’ of its economic 
space ‘in the face of intensified international [...] competition’ (Jessop, 2002: 124). Today 
one finds political forces playing a central role in eliminating barriers to the free 
accumulation of capital, e.g. labour rights, and promoting  ‘economic and extra-economic 
conditions’ (Jessop, 2002: 95) leading to ‘huge transfer of public funds to private power’ 
(Chomsky, 1999: 67-8). If one adapts Cole’s logic of reasoning to the present situation, one 
no longer merely finds the state, as social organisation, falling victim to economic 
‘perversion,’ but rather sees this institution as one of its key culprits, reflecting contemporary 
arguments concerning the statist nature of the supposedly anti-statist neoliberal project 
(Harvey 2005). In fact, in Cole’s work, one finds a range of sociological considerations with 
which to better appreciate the full scope of the perverse effects of neoliberal forces on 
society, by complementing the Marxian critique of the state’s role in promoting the interests 
of capital with a critique of its role in distorting associative life.  
 
Furthermore, Cole consistently deplored the fact that the political system had developed into 
a ‘single omnicompetent representative assembly’ (Cole, 1920: 108) attempting to manage a 
‘vast society which changed its basic structure so fast that the magnitude and growing 
16 
 
complication of its problems outran hopelessly their capacity to learn the difficult art of 
collective control’ (Cole, 1950: 91). The key issue at hand here is the incapacity of the state 
to promote ‘active [...] citizenship’ (Cole, 1920: 113). On the one hand, Cole takes issue with 
the form of representation entailed by liberal democratic decision-making processes, which 
continue to predominate in contemporary Western political systems. Their inadequacies, he 
argues, is explained by the fact that ‘as soon as the voters have exercised their votes, their 
existence as a group lapses until the time when a new election is required’ (Cole, 1920: 110). 
Since ‘no man’s will can be treated as a substitute for, or representative of, the wills of 
others’ (Cole, 1920: 103), liberal democracy is based on a ‘false theory of representation’ 
(Cole, 1920: 103). In short, it excludes the forms of associative action necessary for truly 
active political participation.  
 
Although Cole lived long enough to witness the gradual expansion of the state’s 
administrative apparatus following the political and economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s, 
he had already expressed concerns regarding the effects of bureaucratisation on personal 
freedom prior to this period. For Cole, the key problem with such a ‘machinery’ was not its 
size but its very nature (Cole, 1918: 36). In addition to the problems of representation 
mentioned above, bureaucracy manages all affairs from the ‘point of view of “efficiency”’ 
and at the expense of ‘full and complete’ freedom (Cole, 1918: 25). By subsuming 
individuals’ variegated interests under the universal yardstick of economic efficiency, it is 
thought to bear restrictive effects on individuals’ actions. Bureaucracy, then, is yet another 
political institution restricting the freedom of individuals and an additional instance of the 
perversion of the political sphere by economic interests under capitalism. Initially, then, it 
seems that Cole would have welcomed the neoliberal critique of the bureaucratic state. 
However, upon closer examination, what Cole’s critique of political institutions under 
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capitalism – including his critique of bureaucracy – seems to offer is a basis upon which to 
grasp such measures as yet another, and indeed more total, instance of economic perversion. 
Adopting Cole’s own reasoning, then, individuals could be said to end up more directly and 
completely exposed to volatile economic forces ultimately responsible for increased 
economic insecurity, sharper socio-economic inequalities and de-solidarisation under the 
neoliberal regime. Consequently, had Cole lived long enough, he would have surely 
condemned the role played by an increased exposure to market forces and their evidently 
pernicious effects on the ‘motives which hold men together in association.’ 
 
In his critique of liberal capitalism, then, Cole grappled with the obstacles to human 
emancipation by condemning the perverse and distorting effects of ‘bad institutions’ on self-
expression and associative action. Under the guise of neoliberal capitalism, one finds a 
historically specific configuration of economic and political forces further undermining the 
capacity for collective control and authentic self-expression. Flexible labour and consumer 
markets, sharp socio-economic inequalities and the ‘competitive Schumpeterian state’ 
(Jessop, 2002) all affect social relations in a particular way. More specifically, they lead to a 
divorce of the pursuit of self-expression from the ‘primitive social impulse,’ further subject 
individuals to the divisive rule of market forces and impose additional barriers to political 
representation of social plurality.  Here we see his critique was not simply a realisation of a 
pluralist political position, as suggested by others (Hirst 1994), but rather one founded on a 
Rousseau-ian sociological base.  
 
Despite such obstacles to human emancipation, however, the present situation offers new 
opportunities for radical social change. The next section shall therefore aim to expose them, 
while highlighting the relevance of his libertarian socialist alternative to neoliberalism.  
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Bringing Associative Action to Life 
In the first chapter of Guild Socialism Restated, Cole described the task of the guild socialist, 
i.e. his own task, as follows:  
He [the guild socialist] claims, not to be imagining a Utopia in the clouds, but to be giving 
form and direction to certain quite definite tendencies which are now at work in Society, and 
to be anticipating the most natural developments of already existing institutions and social 
forces. (Cole, 1980: 11)  
Some of these ‘definite tendencies’ were highlighted above and demonstrate the grounded, 
sociological, nature of his critique and alternative. There, it was shown that Cole treats 
associative action as a necessary – and therefore pre-existing – condition for all forms of 
social organisation including present ones, and places it at the core of his sociological 
approach. Under the spell of capitalist economic interests, associative action does not vanish, 
it merely becomes subsumed under the ethos of competitive individualism, economic 
efficiency and a coercive political machine. Cole’s task consequently consists in creating 
conditions under which the associative spirit or will can thrive and become the central force 
mediating social relations, i.e. to substitute ‘bad’ institutions with ‘good’ ones.  
 
Cole’s remedy to the ills of capitalism assumes the form of a libertarian socialist alternative 
which aims to re-organise society in such a way as to ‘afford the greatest possible opportunity 
for individual and collective self-expression to all its members’ (Cole, 1980: 13). Voluntary, 
open, inclusive and democratic associations are here the chosen form of social organisation, 
for in them individuals are thought to be in the best position to ‘agree[...] together upon 
certain methods of procedure, and lay[...] down, in however rudimentary a form, rules for 
common action’ (Cole, 1920: 37). The democratic and generally cooperative character of 
practices flourishing within such associations are treated by Cole as ideal conditions for the 
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development of a ‘communal spirit’ (Cole, 1980: 46) and the elimination of the various 
‘hindrances’ to self-expression such as inequality, bureaucratic managerialism and the 
division of labour. Thus, in virtue of their capacity to give full scope to horizontal decision-
making processes, democratic associations play a central part in Cole’s attempt to ‘offer the 
means to resolve the familiar tensions between political power and individual development’ 
(Eisenberg, 1995: 5).9  This, in fact, partly explains its appeal to political theorists as a third 
way when shorn of its anti-capitalist elements. 
 
Various additional conditions for emancipation were laid down by Cole. Firstly, he believed 
that the realisation of such conditions was predicated upon ‘self-government on the smallest 
natural units of control’ (Cole, 1980: 101). The close interpersonal proximity these ‘small 
units’ tend to confer would facilitate the development of values of ‘cheerfulness, 
comradeliness, co-operativeness, consideration, kindness’ (Cole, 1950: 7). By ‘natural’ Cole 
meant ‘[m]en’s easiest ways of grouping’ and, as such, refer to units such as ‘the places they 
live in and the places they work in’ (Cole, 1950: 107). Both the size and locality of 
associations are therefore treated as important factors by Cole, for these conditions are 
instrumental in shaping the spirit of fellowship and facilitating the representation of the 
plurality of interests making up social life.  In a complex and differentiated neoliberal world, 
whereby ‘differences pile up one upon the other’ (Bauman, 1997: 13), Cole’s associations 
would not only provide means for the institutional recognition of plurality, but would also 
serve to alleviate the ‘overwhelming sensation of insecurity’ (Bauman, 1997: 204) 
accompanying it. For Cole, this re-organisation of social life could only be achieved through 
a re-organisation of economic life. 
 
                                                          
9 Although Eisenberg makes this claim with regards to the potential of political pluralism in general – not Cole’s 
own – it was shown above that Cole does succeed in combining both elements.   
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To the ‘industrial autocracy of capitalism’ (Cole, 1980: 51), Cole opposed ‘a free [economic] 
system [that] will bring to the front man’s natural qualities – his sense of fellowship, his 
desire to express himself’ (Cole, 1917: 256). Such a ‘free system,’ would alter the experience 
of producers in such a way as to ‘make the enterprise he works in a success, not in terms of 
profit, but in terms of rendering a good service to the consuming public, and thus contributing 
towards the improvement of the general standard of living’ (Cole, 1957b: 36). Democratic 
associations of producers, the modern guilds, would not only secure the collective forms of 
control required for authentic self-expression, but would also substitute the ‘motives of greed 
[...] and fear’ with ‘the spirit of free and communal service.’ Such a spirit is, today, partly 
exemplified by the production of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) programmes 
providing a free service while relying on a form of ‘voluntaristic cooperation that does not 
depend on exclusive proprietary control or common relations as among the co-operators’ 
(Benkler 2013:214), such as Mozilla Firefox or Wikipedia.  
 
Now in a position to make collective decisions regarding the pace of the labour process and 
the nature of the tasks involved in making the products, members of democratically organised 
associations can begin to expect working conditions giving them ample scope for creative 
and, following Cole’s reasoning, pleasurable practices.  The emergence of joint-stock 
companies as a ‘sign of the growing ‘democratisation’ of the capitalist system’ (Cole, 1948: 
123) could initially be said to have marked a further democratisation of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the limited power accorded to voters and the growing concentration of capital 
found in such a system (Piketty, 2014) means such bodies are associative ‘only in form’ 
(Cole, 1948: 103), thereby demonstrating the limit of capitalism’s capacity to align 
individuals’ interests with the common good.  This indicates the need for structural change in 
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both production and market conditions, which Cole recognised and proposed to undertake 
through a re-organisation of the relationship between production and consumption: 
A man is usually either a miner or a railway-man, and not both; but he consumes coal, uses 
the railways, and only limits the variety of his consumption by his lack of opportunity. But in 
both the essential social differentiation is not that between individuals but that between 
interests or concerns, that is, between types of production and consumption. (Cole, 1980: 81) 
Implicit in this passage is Cole’s rejection of some elements of liberal thinking. What he 
partly wishes to convey here is the fact that the pursuit of freedom through self-expression 
does not lead to a separation or differentiation between individuals. A key failure of 
(neo)liberalism is to overlook the fact that the very process involved in such a pursuit entails, 
and is indeed most successfully accomplished through, the collaboration with other 
individuals sharing similar interests. In societies subjected to the logic of the capitalist 
market, the competitive pursuit of freedom by the producer often confronts that of the 
consumer as an obstacle to the latter. Here one not only finds a differentiation/separation 
between the producer and consumer but, more crucially, an antagonism between these 
parties, which assumes a particularly acute form in societies more completely exposed to the 
vicissitudes of market forces. Cole’s proposal to rethink the relationship between them is, 
given the aforementioned contemporary focus on consumerism as a realm of self-
actualisation, timely. He did so by pointing out a crucial feature of the process of satisfaction 
of needs, namely the fact that, by definition, the interests of producers and consumers are 
necessarily in a state of mutual dependence. Without the production of a good, the consumer 
is unable to use it. Without the consumption of a good, the raison d’être of a product and a 
producer’s work vanishes. For this reason, he concluded that  
the whole body of consumers and the whole body of producers are practically the same 
people, only ranged in the two cases in different formations. There can be no real divergence 
of interests between them. (Cole, 1980: 38-9) 
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By rethinking the relationship between producer and consumer, Cole offers a platform upon 
which to re-evaluate the place held by associative action in the process of satisfaction of 
needs. One finds that the conditions for collective control are not confined to actions between 
different producers or consumers, but are equally attainable (and indeed desirable) in 
relations between these two spheres. It is from this stance that Cole came to design his own 
alternative to the capitalist market, which we shall call here the ‘dialogical coordination of 
needs satisfaction’. 
 
As we have seen, for Cole, actually existing emancipation rests on individuals’ capacity to 
achieve collective control.  Therefore, he construed his task as one primarily oriented towards 
the elimination of all hindrances to such control both within and between the spheres of 
production and consumption. Within the productive sphere a key indicator of such a change 
could be found in cooperatives, whereby the implementation of ‘one member, one vote’ 
(Cole 1948: 127) provided a basis for collective control. Their potential role in serving  large-
scale social change has in fact recently been emphasised by several contemporary 
commentators (Alperovitz, 2011; Wyatt, 2011; Wolff, 2012; Shantz and Macdonald, 2013), 
thereby making them more likely agents of change than those Cole (1980) had in mind, 
namely the trade unions. Cole was nevertheless conscious of the need for cooperatives 
currently to submit to the demands of the capitalist market.  Their potential for emancipation 
was necessitated on the need for public ownership and a non-capitalist market based upon the 
dialogical coordination of needs satisfaction. In an associative body such as the cooperative, 
the spirit of free and unfettered service would be secured by giving workers the means to 
control the labour process, and consumers the means to define their needs collectively. 
However, the prospects for the generalised release of this spirit rest on producers and 
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consumers fully ‘negotiat[ing] on equal terms’ (Cole, 1917: 86).  Another level of 
cooperation, this time between producers and consumers, is therefore required.  
 
Here dialogical coordination comes to play a key role in virtue of making ‘the fullest 
provision for joint consultation and action between the Guilds and the consumers’ 
organisations at every stage, local, regional and national’ (Cole, 1980: 90-1). With it, the 
‘invisible hand’ of the capitalist market dictating the allocation of resources and limiting the 
effective control of producers and consumers alike vanishes, to pave the way for a consistent 
dialogue between representatives of associations in each of the two dimensions 
(supply/production and demand/consumption) of the process of satisfaction of needs. While 
the flexibility of post-Fordism equipped production with a stronger capacity to meet the 
plurality of wants and introduced ‘cooperation’ as a ‘key managerial strategy and a dominant 
corporate ideology of flexible accumulation’ (Kasmir, 1996: 30), it did so at the expense of 
economic security and consumer association as opposed to atomisation. What Cole’s 
dialogical coordination offers is a third way which aims to achieve a combination of 
autonomy and security. As such, he provides means for the institutionalisation of the 
‘collective protection’ of freedom, which Bauman himself has repeatedly urged to realise in 
societies subjected to the fragmentary rule of privatisation and flexibilisation (1997: 205). 
The freedom to choose and release of the various ‘creative, scientific and artistic impulses’ 
through production and consumption would here, Cole believed, be given the means to 
become a meaningful and collective endeavour. It would oppose the rather ‘corrosive’ 
(Sennett, 1998) effects of flexible labour markets and individualistic search of pleasure 
characterising contemporary capitalist societies, which implicitly rely on collective notions of 
‘good’ consumption found in reference groups (Bauman, 1997) with fully emancipatory 
practices. In order to meet its objectives, however, the aforementioned second level of 
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cooperation must develop a system of representation capable of giving the fullest scope to 
both consumers’ and producers’ wills/interests in dialogue. 
 
It is here that Cole makes a second distinctive contribution, but this time as the alternative to 
(neo)liberal democratic (‘false’) representation. His critique of liberal democracy led him to 
rethink the relationship between the economy and politics in such a way as to overcome the 
perversion of the latter by the former alongside its lack of functional representation. This, he 
argued, can only be achieved once the distance between the representative and the 
represented is minimised, and channels of communication between the local, regional and 
national levels are fully developed. This is done in two ways. Firstly, Cole insisted on the 
availability of a ‘right of recall’ by the represented party on the representative (Cole, 1980: 
134). Secondly, the ‘true’ representation of the general will of a local association – itself an 
extension of an individual’s will – can only be expected under conditions whereby the 
purpose of the association, i.e. its function, is itself being represented. Only then could 
political representation give recognition to the social value of an association’s function and 
become a real source of social empowerment, for the ’functional organisation of Society 
contains in itself the guarantee of the recognition of the fact that society is based upon the 
individuals’  (Cole, 1920: 192). Representing the function of an organisation at the political 
level therefore entails a direct representation of an individual’s will. As ‘the underlying 
principle of social organisation’ (Cole, 1920: 48), then, function ought to become the 
underlying principle of political representation if the latter is to be expected to give scope to 
personal freedom. The state as we know it would here vanish to pave the way for producer 
guilds and consumer councils functionally represented and coordinated by a ‘commune’ at 
the local, regional and national levels (Cole, 1980: 124).   
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Given the increasingly complex and globalised nature of the contemporary world, however, 
one is justified in asking how Cole sought to address the problem of international relations. 
Such a theme was picked up by Holthaus, who convincingly demonstrated how Cole’s own 
‘functionalism,’ particularly the one found in his work following the Guild Socialist phase, 
could make it possible to envisage ‘democratic empowerment and transnational co-operation’ 
(2014: 15). Here, Cole’s functionalism is said to have combined ‘some economic democracy 
and consent about long-term economic aims’ (Holthaus, 2014: 12) in an institutional vision 
oriented towards the international coordination of the process of satisfaction of needs.10  
 
The global significance of Cole’s thought can also be found in some contemporary global 
formations, most notably the alter-globalization – at least in its ‘way of subjectivity’ form 
(Pleyers 2011) – and Occupy Wall Street movements.  These developed ways of organising 
which, in their use of groupings such as ‘general assemblies’ and ‘working groups’ in order 
to achieve ‘horizontal’ organisation around ‘consensus’ (Flank, 2011: 8), reflected the 
‘functional bodies’ organised in a commune as advocated by Cole (cf. Cole, 1980: 124).  The 
sociological value of Cole’s perspective lies in the link it draws between the pluralisation of 
everyday life, that we engage in multiple forms of production, consumption and civic 
activity, and the multiple points of entry, including the functionally specific points, which he 
advocates for the political sphere.  The diversification of movements, found in the way of 
subjectivity, reflects these conditions and the shift to what Boltanski terms the ‘artistic 
critique’ which ‘becomes exasperated with all which standardises, uniformises and massifies’ 
(Boltanski 2002:6).  Like Cole, then, members of contemporary social movements seek to 
accommodate the pluralist reality of complex and differentiated societies in highly 
                                                          
10 Holthaus (2014) did nevertheless reveal that Cole’s international thought fell short of developing a vision 
capable of fully excluding the state from the management of international affairs.  
26 
 
consensual decision-making processes aimed at unleashing the free communal spirit through 
seemingly functional forms of representation11.     
 
Conclusion 
Keen to circumvent the aporias of mere negation and unwilling to find comfort in the belief 
in capitalism’s self-destruction, Cole unreservedly and unashamedly construed his task as 
sociologist in distinctively prescriptive terms. His work not only reveals a high degree of 
optimism regarding individuals’ capacity to become ‘socially good,’ but also proposes 
possible avenues for the attainment of such a goal. To the perversion of an innate impulse 
towards sociality by capitalist and liberal democratic institutions, he opposed a form of social 
empowerment thought to facilitate the undistorted release of such an impulse.  
 
Like the Burawoyan (2005) public sociologist, Cole would want us to take a moral stance; to 
publicly condemn what one views as intolerable conditions of existence; to engage with and 
serve the public so as to maximise the progressive impact of sociological research. But Cole’s 
ambition for sociology (and social sciences as a whole) also reached beyond the confines of 
contemporary public sociology. He did not merely seek to induce social change by 
stimulating indignation, but complemented the latter by an ambitious programme of action 
which could today serve as an invaluable source for the task of counteracting divisive 
neoliberal forces and reinvigorating associative life like a phoenix rising from the ashes of 
economic perversion.  
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